"First of all, during the war, everybody has problems, even you. But you have a nice ocean and don’t feel [the problems] now. But you will feel it in the future." - Volodymyr Zelenskyy
I have had a draft post on the need for a coordinated European strategic defence capability as a work in progress for a little while. I must concede sometimes world events move more rapidly than my writing on geopolitics and the framing keeps shifting, even if the overarching message is a constant.
Few shifts in framing without a gun being fired are as dramatic as the meeting between President Zelenskyy and President Trump, with significant, if petulant, contributions from Vice President Vance. There was much to analyse from the exchange but I want to focus in on one specific line from President Zelenskyy which I think speaks to a far longer term issue than the relations between any two national leaders. In referencing the "ocean" protecting America, Zelenskyy pinpointed the single strongest argument for Europe not to be dependent on a US military for its security. However, I would question his assertion that the States would feel similar problems to Ukraine in the future.
The United States is not immune from external state-led aggression. There are only 55 miles between mainland Russia and Alaska and if one views the globe from above with shipping lanes opening due to melting ice it is conceivable to see new strategic challenges emerging for North America, though largely Canada, as a result. Nonetheless, with a largely non-troublesome Canada to the north of the continental US and the issues on the southern border with Mexico largely related to immigration control and contraband, there is not, nor ever likely to be a significant state-on-state threat to the United States.
The counter to this would be the Cold War which both goes some way to prove and challenge the point. The Cuban Missile Crisis was a direct threat to the US and as a result it is not a surprise that it came very close to direct conflict between the powers. However, the Cold War was not built on territorial conquest of the other main protagonist, it was a battle for influence and ideology across the globe. While intelligence operatives worked in rival nations, there was never a realistic prospect of US tanks on Soviet soil or vice versa.
The threat during the Cold War to western Europe from the Soviet Union, and today for much of Europe from Russia is quite different. While there will at times be a convergence of strategic interests between the United States and Europe, there is a far longer-term difference in perspective which demonstrates the naivety of European reliance on US hard power. It is the difference between the ocean and the doorstep.
Furthermore, this assessment is not simply about aggression from Russia, it is also relevant to modelling potential spillover from Middle Eastern conflicts, either World War, or multiple military campaigns throughout history which have seen the front line in Europe. While the context might be heightened by the policy and antics of the Trump administration the strategic predicament is by no means new.
In fairness to the United States, successive presidents have made the entirely reasonable point that while some nations hit and achieve the NATO spending requirement on defence, on the whole Europe does not pay its way in the alliance. Too often rhetoric from European leaders is not matched by hardware or organisational infrastructure. The situation existed long before the first Trump presidency, but that having experienced four years of Trumpian foreign policy, Europe was still unprepared for his re-election was an appalling failure of European governments.
That the UK was in the vanguard of support for Ukraine following the 2022 invasion perhaps demonstrates that the mechanisms of the European Union are not best equipped for rapid (but thoughtful) reaction to such incidents with its currently policy making structures. Furthermore, the strategic geography of, non-EU member, Norway with an immense Atlantic coastline, border with Russia and oil and gas supplies makes it crucial to security planning.
There is also a logic to Britain and France being at the fore of a coordinated European strategic defence capability. Two nuclear powers with similar geopolitical contexts and that in large part balance one another in terms of population size and economy scale. This is in contrast to either being the very little brother in comparison to the United States’ scope. Germany needs to step up. The nation's reluctance to develop a strong military in the last 75 years is understandable, but it holds world leading manufacturing capability which will prove essential to develop strategically secure defence production lines. Often the political leadership on security has come from the Baltic nations, Poland and Moldova, of course, along with Ukraine. Exactly, what criteria a coordinated European strategic defence capability would apply for membership would be a matter for debate, but there would be many influential components allowing a range of nations prominent roles. The EU should be at the table, and in Kaja Kallas they have a well chosen High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, but there are reasons to argue it is not the body required to steer a European strategic defence.
In truth, I am not optimistic that we will see the action to match the rhetoric. Even now, there is a reluctance to build for a future less reliant on the United States simply on the basis the US is needed for European defence today and cannot be seen to be shunned. This is short-sighted and ties European nations into ever more reliance on a neighbour with different strategic considerations. It is in the mutual interest of both US and Europe for the latter to markedly increase its defence capability. To do so would not be rejecting a successful NATO but reinforcing defence contigency and resilience. Political leaders come and go but the ocean and the doorstep remain a constant.
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