Monday, 17 February 2025

Political realignment and its limitations

I recall a discussion in Portcullis House in 2017 in which a perceptive political researcher set out their understanding of a political realignment which they believed to be underway. The broad themes already existed, but in this telling it became a coherent and engaging narrative. This was in part informed by Brexit and in years to come would be supported by the allegiance switch of the red wall.

The identity-focused progressive left had seemingly become more prominent in the Labour movement, and their world view was distinct from the working-class roots of the party. Nonetheless, it would take something seismic to detach them from their voting behaviour. Brexit and Boris combined to that affect. Today, Reform UK appear to be establishing themselves as the main beneficiary of this realignment.

The general election of 2024 arguably bucked the trend. Far from appearing divided between their support base, Labour romped home with ease. However, that was more a reflection of credibility in government in a two-horse race, than any clear endorsement of their policy agenda. The Conservatives were left to contemplate whether they had a future in either Hartlepool or Henley.

The general theory of a realignment appears to hold up and also seems often reflected in election results abroad. Long-term this will present a fundamental challenge to the political left, yet in the UK it appears in the short-term to be causing consternation on the political right. The Conservatives have had a decade of being unsure how to respond to various Farage-led brands.

There are those who argue that the Tories should lean into realignment, a point which is logical to an extent but in recent times the interpretation as to what this has meant has become increasingly unhinged. During the later days of Rishi Sunak's government, normally sensible cabinet members were flirting with social-media driven conspiracy theories. Many in the party seem unbothered that they are ignoring their long-time voters as they get into the culture war trenches. Arguably, no segment of the electorate in Britain is currently less well served than the moderate centre-right, the mythologised 'middle England' which used to be the electoral battleground. Who will speak for Mondeo man or Worcester woman now?

Little has been learned from the experience of Twitter/X to make fools of those who treat is as a gauge of public opinion. To Remainers, Twitter was seen as demonstrating a groundswell of support for a second referendum. There was, in reality, never anything like a majority for such an idea. Even among Remain voters, plenty accepted the result and wanted to move on. To Corbynistas it seemed Twitter was showing a path to Number 10 for their man, which was a significant distortion of what happened in both 2017 and, especially, 2019 elections. Now, X is seen by some on the right has a platform which speaks the truth the establishment cannot handle. This is just as much a distortion of the priorities of the electorate as the earlier examples.

The realignment narrative appears to be accurate, but the certainty with which some argue that it backs up their more confrontational stances looks far more shaky. If one asks a voter their view on a culture war issue, they might take a side. If one asks them their view on what matters most to them, there is a fair chance the answer will be more mundane, more tangible, and politically trickier to deliver than a soundbite on X.

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