A year until the Senedd election

I write this on the eve of the 2025 English local elections and, more pertinently, with a year to go until we are on the eve of the Senedd elections. The narrative following this week's elections may feed into assessments as to what awaits us in 2026, so it seemed a good moment to make some observations before the news agenda is overtaken by the votes in parts of England.

Three parties are within the margin of error

Senedd elections tend to be underwhelming. We make our excitement out of Labour holding off the Tories in the Vale of Glamorgan, or Plaid making a breakthrough in Rhondda, or the Conservatives edging out the Lib Dems in "B'n'R". Nonetheless, the overarching narrative is Labour end up in power. Indeed, Labour is unbeaten in Wales in a domestic election for over 100 years.

There is a fair chance, the party will extend that run, but polling has shown very little between Labour, Plaid Cymru and Reform, arguably with the momentum on the side of their rivals.

Labour

At the 2024 UK election we saw a case study of what happens when a party has three leaders in a year and a large proportion of the existing members stand down at election time. It does not end well for that party.

For years we have heard Senedd Labour members talking up the value of a Labour government at either end of the M4 (Pont Abraham & Chiswick?!). Now it has occurred relations seem more strained than initially billed. Of course, being in government requires making unpopular decisions and a narrative has developed which suggests that Labour in power in Westminster will hit their chances in Wales due to controversial policies. This is undoubtedly true to an extent, but I would argue it is not the whole story.

Whether one agrees with the policy agenda of the Westminster government or not, what is noticeable is the pace with which it is seeking to deliver policy change. Big decisions on taxation, welfare, planning reform and regional devolution have happened rapidly. UK Labour is a party which knows it needs to make the most of its big majority today. Labour in Wales appear pedestrian in comparison. Understandably for a party in power for 26 years it is a big task to reinvent itself with the vigour with which their Westminster colleagues are working.

Plaid Cymru

One may agree or disagree with what they propose but the level of detail Plaid Cymru is already entering into with policy reports on important topics but not those which necessarily lend themselves to campaign literature is impressive. This is not a matter of throwing red meat to their core vote, it is preparing an agenda for government. It is healthy for our democracy when challenger parties take this approach. There is a fair chance that some form of agreement between Plaid and Labour will lead to the formation of the next Welsh Government. Obviously, the battle to lead is going to be fierce, but Plaid also appears to be preparing a comprehensive set of policies which they could take into any negotiation. 

Talk of independence as an aspiration rather than a timetabled objective has helped broaden the party's appeal. The party must maintain a focus on credible governance over constitutional wrangling. The SNP would be a bad model to follow, they focused heavily on grievance but demonstrated little in terms of solutions. Plaid show signs of adopting a more measured approach.

Reform UK

It has become commonplace for critics of Reform UK to write them off as populist and offering incoherent policies depending on the audience or point in time. I think this underestimates the philosophical underpinning of Reform UK and a wider movement which includes some Conservatives. There has been a political realignment amongst the electorate which has created the environment for Reform UK to make inroads. This can be seen in the work of thinkers such as David Goodhart or, Tory MP, Danny Kruger. However, there are still tensions for the party to resolve such as a desire for small government and an interventionist state. 

Reform UK is approaching elections differently to other parties, that in itself is interesting to seek to understand. A question remains as to the extent the party really wants to govern Wales. An argument could be made that it suits the party's UK election ambitions to be the biggest party and then be "shut out of power by a backroom deal between the establishment parties" in Wales. I would hope all parties contesting the Senedd election are doing so with the ambition to govern.

A further point of caution for Reform UK, and some Conservatives, would be the limitations of a fragmented media. In the past we have seen Twitter activity present a distorted view of the extent of support for a second referendum or for the election of Jeremy Corbyn. Today, X presents a radicalised vision of politics which is not reflective of the electorate at large. That there has been a realignment should not be mistaken for an electoral salience for every idea expressed by a party supporter.

Conservatives

From an electorate viewpoint the Welsh Conservative Party has always struggled to demonstrate agency separate to that of the UK party. The actions of the UK party leader are more likely to sway voters in Wales than that of the Senedd group. This makes it remarkably difficult for the Senedd Tories to influence their own voter-base. It is an unenviable position. That said, the Conservatives have adopted a slogan of 'Fix Wales' under which they hope to draw together their proposals for government. A year out, the most prominent pledges seek to reverse decisions already made about Senedd expansion, and speed limits. It is difficult to view these as credible costed pledges which could be delivered, and they feel more like a campaigning tactic to try and turn out a core vote. It is not unreasonable that voters should expect the official opposition to propose a comprehensive programme for government and hopefully we will hear more about the plans to 'fix Wales' over the coming twelve months.

Lib Dems

The party has underperformed in Wales compared to England and Scotland. The recent sweeping success across the south of England poses an interesting question for the future direction of the UK Lib Dems. Do they shift towards the centre-right reflecting many of their constituents in the home counties and west country or do they double-down on leaning leftwards to fill a gap by UK Labour's shift at least to the centre?

In Wales, they appear caught in the middle of that dilemma. A sole MS who leans left in a rural area where the Conservatives have traditionally been their primary opponent. Known for their attention to policy detail, it will nonetheless be difficult for the Lib Dems to be heard in the election. 

An appreciation for cross-country running

I've been getting muddy. While I had run a cross-country race in 2022 and two in 2023, it has only been this season (Oct 2024 - March 2025) in which I have really started to appreciate the sport in its own right as opposed to it just being a different variation on running.

The Gwent League is the premier competition in the South Wales and Bristol region. Races take place across that region, although notably in the current season not actually in Gwent. It is a day long event with age group races taking place, ensuring a buzz of activity when you arrive. In one part of the field will be an encampment of club tents.

I missed the opening fixture at Pembrey Country Park because it clashed with a road 10k I was taking part in on the Wirral, but I did run in the second fixture at Llandaff Fields in Cardiff. In addition to this being a league fixture, it was also the opening round of the British Athletics UK Cross-Challenge series and a gold label World Athletics Cross-Country Tour event. This meant that elite runners were taken part alongside the masses, and I was very much at the slower end of the masses. It is difficult to think of many sports in which you can go from watching athletes compete in Olympic finals to starting alongside them. Even when there are elite runners in a road race, you applaud them from your pen much further back in the field but never really see them after the gun. With cross-country they pass by, just a lap ahead!

Prior to the third Gwent League fixture, I took part in a Gwent Leisure Centre League race hosted by the club I'm a member of, Lliswerry Runners. This took place in a storm. There were competitors slipping and sliding, including the eventual race winner who face-planted into a muddy puddle on his way to victory. While fraught while running, it was the kind of event that you leave with plenty of stories. The Leisure Centre league is a relatively smaller event contested between nine clubs in Gwent. The next Gwent League fixture was at Blaise Castle in Bristol, the third time I'd taken part in this race in three years.

While there were no Gwent League fixtures in January, there was the Welsh Cross Country Championships. Following some cajoling from Lliswerry Runners I entered, although in truth, even a few days beforehand I was unsure if I'd take part. I did not feel I was a good enough runner to be in something called the Welsh Championships. I was used to finishing towards the back of the field at Gwent League races, and feared I could become detached from a race at this level. I went for it and I finished 174th in a field of 193. Too close for comfort, but not left behind. Due in part to a quirk of how many teams were taking part, I unexpectedly (to the extent I had to ask for it to be explained to me) helped Lliswerry to an age group team bronze medal.

The league restarted in February although I missed that race at Margam Park, Port Talbot due to a cold. The final races of the Gwent League and Leisure Centre League seasons took place on successive weekends in March in Brecon, and Newport (hosted by Griffithstown Harriers) respectively. In each Gwent League fixture I took part in, I was the last finisher for my club. Nonetheless, those finishes all came with a sense of satisfaction.

In addition, to my own running I have taken a broader interest in cross-country watching broadcasts of the other legs of the Cross Challenge Series, English National Championships and European Championships. I am not sure I have necessarily picked up running tips for next season, but I've definitely added a depth to my understanding of the sport and that has built an enthusiasm for next season. I am already re-considering some of my running plans for late 2025.

There is a vibrancy around cross-country, although I do tend to find that this is lost midway through the race when I am asking myself why did I do this, but it always comes back in the last kilometre. It is an environment in which you witness elite performances from people with whom you shared a start-line. Sometimes, you get to see people who have performed well in local leagues demonstrate just how good they really are when they take on and very best in the country.

At the very highest level there is a debate as to whether cross-country should become an Olympic event, likely in the Winter Olympics. I hope the discipline has that opportunity.

The ocean and the doorstep: the need for a coordinated European strategic defence capability is not new, but it is urgent

"First of all, during the war, everybody has problems, even you. But you have a nice ocean and don’t feel [the problems] now. But you will feel it in the future." - Volodymyr Zelenskyy

I have had a draft post on the need for a coordinated European strategic defence capability as a work in progress for a little while. I must concede sometimes world events move more rapidly than my writing on geopolitics and the framing keeps shifting, even if the overarching message is a constant.

Few shifts in framing without a gun being fired are as dramatic as the meeting between President Zelenskyy and President Trump, with significant, if petulant, contributions from Vice President Vance. There was much to analyse from the exchange but I want to focus in on one specific line from President Zelenskyy which I think speaks to a far longer term issue than the relations between any two national leaders. In referencing the "ocean" protecting America, Zelenskyy pinpointed the single strongest argument for Europe not to be dependent on a US military for its security. However, I would question his assertion that the States would feel similar problems to Ukraine in the future.

The United States is not immune from external state-led aggression. There are only 55 miles between mainland Russia and Alaska and if one views the globe from above with shipping lanes opening due to melting ice it is conceivable to see new strategic challenges emerging for North America, though largely Canada, as a result. Nonetheless, with a largely non-troublesome Canada to the north of the continental US and the issues on the southern border with Mexico largely related to immigration control and contraband, there is not, nor ever likely to be a significant state-on-state threat to the United States.

The counter to this would be the Cold War which both goes some way to prove and challenge the point. The Cuban Missile Crisis was a direct threat to the US and as a result it is not a surprise that it came very close to direct conflict between the powers. However, the Cold War was not built on territorial conquest of the other main protagonist, it was a battle for influence and ideology across the globe. While intelligence operatives worked in rival nations, there was never a realistic prospect of US tanks on Soviet soil or vice versa.

The threat during the Cold War to western Europe from the Soviet Union, and today for much of Europe from Russia is quite different. While there will at times be a convergence of strategic interests between the United States and Europe, there is a far longer-term difference in perspective which demonstrates the naivety of European reliance on US hard power. It is the difference between the ocean and the doorstep.

Furthermore, this assessment is not simply about aggression from Russia, it is also relevant to modelling potential spillover from Middle Eastern conflicts, either World War, or multiple military campaigns throughout history which have seen the front line in Europe. While the context might be heightened by the policy and antics of the Trump administration the strategic predicament is by no means new.

In fairness to the United States, successive presidents have made the entirely reasonable point that while some nations hit and achieve the NATO spending requirement on defence, on the whole Europe does not pay its way in the alliance. Too often rhetoric from European leaders is not matched by hardware or organisational infrastructure. The situation existed long before the first Trump presidency, but that having experienced four years of Trumpian foreign policy, Europe was still unprepared for his re-election was an appalling failure of European governments.

That the UK was in the vanguard of support for Ukraine following the 2022 invasion perhaps demonstrates that the mechanisms of the European Union are not best equipped for rapid (but thoughtful) reaction to such incidents with its currently policy making structures. Furthermore, the strategic geography of, non-EU member, Norway with an immense Atlantic coastline, border with Russia and oil and gas supplies makes it crucial to security planning.

There is also a logic to Britain and France being at the fore of a coordinated European strategic defence capability. Two nuclear powers with similar geopolitical contexts and that in large part balance one another in terms of population size and economy scale. This is in contrast to either being the very little brother in comparison to the United States’ scope. Germany needs to step up. The nation's reluctance to develop a strong military in the last 75 years is understandable, but it holds world leading manufacturing capability which will prove essential to develop strategically secure defence production lines. Often the political leadership on security has come from the Baltic nations, Poland and Moldova, of course, along with Ukraine. Exactly, what criteria a coordinated European strategic defence capability would apply for membership would be a matter for debate, but there would be many influential components allowing a range of nations prominent roles. The EU should be at the table, and in Kaja Kallas they have a well chosen High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, but there are reasons to argue it is not the body required to steer a European strategic defence.

In truth, I am not optimistic that we will see the action to match the rhetoric. Even now, there is a reluctance to build for a future less reliant on the United States simply on the basis the US is needed for European defence today and cannot be seen to be shunned. This is short-sighted and ties European nations into ever more reliance on a neighbour with different strategic considerations. It is in the mutual interest of both US and Europe for the latter to markedly increase its defence capability. To do so would not be rejecting a successful NATO but reinforcing defence contigency and resilience. Political leaders come and go but the ocean and the doorstep remain a constant.

The devolution difference

A paper published in the Lancet medical journal in 2022 considered the effect of devolution on health in Greater Manchester. It noted that life expectancy had improved in comparison with the trend across England since legislation introduced a city region metro mayor. I sought out data to do a similar, albeit not as detailed, assessment as to the pattern of life expectancy in Wales in comparison to England over the now 26 years since devolution was introduced. Thus far though I’ve been unable to find sufficiently comparable data across that time period.

Devolution across the UK has a very different meaning in each location. Even the metro mayoralties have different remits and competences from one another due to the nature of the city deal struck between UK Government and local combined authority. Across the nations the difference is starker. 

Nonetheless, at its core there are two broad versions of devolution, that to the nation which we see in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales and that which we see to regions in England, often though not exclusively, around a major urban conurbation. 

National devolution is based on shared identity. What unites people in Ynys Mon and Monmouthshire is a form of Welsh identity and solidarity which is accessible to those who move to the nation as well as those born here. What unites the people of the ‘West of England’ (or Bristol and Bath city region) is a shared grumble that the A4 is congested; that once upon a time South Gloucestershire and Bristol Councils couldn’t agree a tram route; and that house prices are too high, to give a few examples. The identity distinction between Bristol and Bath is strong, the idea of a unity of identity with the south west is present but not prominent. Bluntly the city region is a pragmatic tool to tackle practical, even mundane, issues.

In the nations, we have recreated mini UK Parliaments. Yes, they are sometimes better behaved, although often not as radically so as some would like to pretend. Structurally though, they hold a similar dynamic to the UK Parliament. Wales is set to adopt a fully proportional electoral system in time for the 2026 Senedd election. This is a welcome step, but it will still have a political geography made up of representatives of constituencies. The significance of the constituency model is that it inevitably incentivises political parties to target specific seats, or more specifically potential voter coalitions within them. For the largest party in a constituency there is often scope to deliver a core vote strategy that turns out enough electors without a need to seek to engage more widely.

A directly elected mayor has quite a different challenge ahead of them. There are a few city regions in which one party is very dominant Greater Liverpool and Greater Manchester for example, but in many there is at least a need for a mayoral candidate to reach out to voters beyond the traditional support for their party. In doing so, they are also listening to a wider range of views and challenges. It instinctively tempers their party tribal instincts.

A mayor is an individual standing on his or her own platform rather whereas an MS is standing on their party’s manifesto platform and will be subject to the party whip if elected. It is what enabled Andy Street in the West Midlands (Greater Birmingham, Coventry & the Black Country) to wear his Conservative rosette lightly. Those who view politics through a Westminster prism might have regarded him as distancing himself from an unpopular government, but we should welcome that devolution brings about leaders capable of charting a distinct path within the broad tradition of their political philosophy. Street did lose, but in a very tight contest in contrast to the way his Conservative Party was thrashed in the subsequent general election.

City devolution in England is under-powered, despite this, polling suggests that mayors enjoy a greater prominence than local MPs in many of the established city regions. With both Conservative and Labour Parties at a UK level now broadly in agreement on the need to decentralise it is reasonable to hope that more power will be handed to these big enough to matter, but small enough to be meaningful regions. Of course, First Ministers of the devolved nations have significant profile, but I’d question to what extent that public recognition extends to even some senior Cabinet members. Confusion exists in both forms of devolution as to with which tier of government certain policy remits lie. Even in this light it is difficult to comprehend why the (very nearly) wholly devolved NHS was cited by 57% of Welsh voters as the top issue for the UK General Election.

Perhaps though, this is a further factor of the nature of the devolution settlement. In Greater Manchester, indeed even beyond it, there is a strong association with Andy Burnham and the re-regulation of local bus services. What would be the equivalent association with a national First Minister? In Wales, in recent times, it might be the 20 mph default urban speed limit but often not from a particularly supportive perspective.

There is something else of significance about that bus policy, which is also being introduced in Liverpool City Region, it is very tangible for the voters to see. Perhaps the most high profile example of a tangible policy from a mayoralty was the introduction of the (then) so-called ‘Boris Bikes’. Parliaments can do tangible, but often their focus is ‘increasing investment in…’ or ‘reducing waiting times for…’. These can be very important, but they are intangible to an ordinary voter unless it directly affects their circumstances.

Combining the less direct nature of the parliamentary model used in the nations and the tendency away from the tangible, I wonder whether there is a further dynamic at play. That the relative influence of ordinary voter compared to public affairs / lobbying organisation is stronger in mayoral areas than devolved nations. It is difficult to prove and certainly open to debate, but consider those two policy examples above. Lobbying organisations led the support for the 20 mph speed limit rather than an obvious groundswell of support from the wider electorate. There is lobbying about bus re-regulation but that topic is very much driven by the experiences of bus users frustrated at how disconnected and expensive services can be. In one instance, the lobbying organisations created the space for people to support them. In the other the public created a need for a lobbying body to emerge to give organisation to their aim.

There should be more examination of what works well in each model of devolution, but we should resist the temptation to class very different decentralisation structures as being equivalent to one another.

Political realignment and its limitations

I recall a discussion in Portcullis House in 2017 in which a perceptive political researcher set out their understanding of a political realignment which they believed to be underway. The broad themes already existed, but in this telling it became a coherent and engaging narrative. This was in part informed by Brexit and in years to come would be supported by the allegiance switch of the red wall.

The identity-focused progressive left had seemingly become more prominent in the Labour movement, and their world view was distinct from the working-class roots of the party. Nonetheless, it would take something seismic to detach them from their voting behaviour. Brexit and Boris combined to that affect. Today, Reform UK appear to be establishing themselves as the main beneficiary of this realignment.

The general election of 2024 arguably bucked the trend. Far from appearing divided between their support base, Labour romped home with ease. However, that was more a reflection of credibility in government in a two-horse race, than any clear endorsement of their policy agenda. The Conservatives were left to contemplate whether they had a future in either Hartlepool or Henley.

The general theory of a realignment appears to hold up and also seems often reflected in election results abroad. Long-term this will present a fundamental challenge to the political left, yet in the UK it appears in the short-term to be causing consternation on the political right. The Conservatives have had a decade of being unsure how to respond to various Farage-led brands.

There are those who argue that the Tories should lean into realignment, a point which is logical to an extent but in recent times the interpretation as to what this has meant has become increasingly unhinged. During the later days of Rishi Sunak's government, normally sensible cabinet members were flirting with social-media driven conspiracy theories. Many in the party seem unbothered that they are ignoring their long-time voters as they get into the culture war trenches. Arguably, no segment of the electorate in Britain is currently less well served than the moderate centre-right, the mythologised 'middle England' which used to be the electoral battleground. Who will speak for Mondeo man or Worcester woman now?

Little has been learned from the experience of Twitter/X to make fools of those who treat is as a gauge of public opinion. To Remainers, Twitter was seen as demonstrating a groundswell of support for a second referendum. There was, in reality, never anything like a majority for such an idea. Even among Remain voters, plenty accepted the result and wanted to move on. To Corbynistas it seemed Twitter was showing a path to Number 10 for their man, which was a significant distortion of what happened in both 2017 and, especially, 2019 elections. Now, X is seen by some on the right has a platform which speaks the truth the establishment cannot handle. This is just as much a distortion of the priorities of the electorate as the earlier examples.

The realignment narrative appears to be accurate, but the certainty with which some argue that it backs up their more confrontational stances looks far more shaky. If one asks a voter their view on a culture war issue, they might take a side. If one asks them their view on what matters most to them, there is a fair chance the answer will be more mundane, more tangible, and politically trickier to deliver than a soundbite on X.

Pondering

What if this blog was to make a comeback? I've dabbled with a few platforms. Nothing has quite felt as straightforward a communication tool as Blogger. In an era of noise, substance trumps style and, while I stop short of promises on the former, I have no illusions of this blog being stylish.

I'm thinking of using it as a mixture of thoughts, opinions and posting interesting resources. This would not be on one topic, but on various things which interest me.

Let's see how things go.